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WHAT DOES THE BUNDESBANK TARGET?
ABSTRACT
Although its primary ultimate objective is price stability, the Bundesbank has drawn a
distinction between its money-focus strategy and the inflation targeting approach recently adopted
by a number of central banks. We show that, holding constant the current forecast of inflation,
German monetary policy responds very little to changes in forecasted money growth; we conclude
that the Bundesbank is much better described as an inflation targeter than as a money targeter. An
additional contribution of the paper is to apply the structural VAR methods of Bemanke and Mihov
(1995) to determine the optimal indicator of German monetary policy: We find that the Lombard rate













In the past few yea~s a significant ntier of central banks--
including those of Canada, New Zealand, Britain, and Sweden--have
adopted some form of “inflation targeting” as a framework for monetary
policy. In an inflation targeting regime, the central bank and/or the
government announce explicit goals for the inflation rate, usually at
several horizons. Although attaitunent of the inflation target does not
necessarily exclude other objectives, such as short-run stabilization of
output or exchange rates, meeting the inflation target at medium and
long horizons is treated as the overriding goal of policy.1
As a strategy for conducting monetary policy, inflation targeting
has some appealing features, including (perhaps) greater ease in
explaining policy objectives to the public and the avoidance of the
“velocity instability” problem that can arise when policy relies heavily
on a single intermediate target. On the other hand, potentially serious
problems with inflation targeting include the difficulty of making
accurate inflation forecasts and reduced accountability arising from the
substantial lags between policy actions and inflation outcomes.
Because inflation targeting bears great promise but also
significant risk for its adopters, it would be most useful to know how
this strategy has worked in practice. Unfortunately, the explicit
adoptions of inflation targets by industrial-country central banks have
all occurred within the last five years or so, so that the relevant
experiences are short. A possible exception to this statement--which
motivates this paper--is the case of Gerrnany.2 Since the end of 1974,
the Bundesbank has conducted monetary policy in a framework that is
lFor excellent discussions of comparative inflation targeting
experience, see Goodhart and Vinals (1994), Leiderman and Svensson
(1995), and Haldane (1995).
‘Switzerland also follows a German-style strategy, although it has
emphasized narrower money aggregates in its intermediate targeting.
1officially designated as money targeting-- and in which money growth
rates certainly play an important role--but which also appears to have
significant elements of inflation targeting. As von Hagen (1995) and
others have emphasized, and as we discuss furthe~ in Section 3, from the
inception of the current regime the Bundesbank has used a projection of
inflation for the next year as the main input to its derivation of its
money growth target. Except for a small blip in 1980, this inflation
projection has been low and steadily declining; since 1986 it has been
constant at 2% per year, the level the Bundesbank deems consistent with
“price stability”. Thus it might be argued that inflation goals, rather
than money growth targets, are the driving force behind German monetary
policy. This conclusion would not be grossly inconsistent with the
German public’s perception of the Bundesbank’s behavior, nor with the
Bundesbank’s 1957 charter, which designates the safe-guarding of the
currency as the bank’s prime responsibility. On the other hand, as we
also docwent in Section 3, the Bundesbank itself draws a strong
distinction between inflation taxgeting, as adopted by the U.K. and
others, and its own money-focused approach; and it argues that the
latter, if feasible, is the superior strategy.
Is the Bundesbank, then, “really” an inflation-targeter or not?
That is the question we try to answer in this paper. To make the
question more precise, we consider the following thought-experiment:
Suppose that the Bundesbank were to observe money growth coming in
higher than expected, but (because of offsetting factors) its forecast
of inflation did not change, Then would the Bundesbank tighten policy?
If not, we would say that for most intents and purposes the Bundesbank
is an inflation targeter. If it did tighten, then we would classify it
as a money targeter (albeit one with important inflation objectives) .
Resolving this question would help us to decide whether to treat
the Bundesbank’s success in controlling inflation as an argument for or
2against the inflation-targeting approach, and perhaps allow us to draw
useful lessons from the Bundesbank’s experience. A more concrete
consideration is the following: Cuxrently, the designers of the
etiryonic European Central Bank are debating the type of monetary policy
strategy the ECB should use, the two leading candidates being inflation-
targeting and money-targeting. There appears to be some political
pressure from Germany for the ECB to adopt money-targeting, presumably
in order to reassure the German public that the ECB’S policies will be
very similar to those of the Bundesbank. We are concerned that money-
targeting might be a poor choice for the ECB, on the grounds that
velocity is likely to be very unstable in the early stages of monetary
union. If it could be demonstrated that the Bundesbank has really been
inflation-targeting (with money targets happening to be a convenient
instrument, given the particular characteristics of the German financial
system), this contentious issue might be resolved.





to changes in money growth, we obviously need some indicator
monetary policy other than money growth itself; we also need
estimates of how changes in this indicator will affect the
of prices and other key variables. These issues are addressed
in Section 2. Like a number of recent authors, we study German monetary






Unlike most recent work, however, we do not simply
particular variable is the appropriate measure of
we follow the methodology advocated by Bernanke and
derive the policy indicator from structural VAR
Bundesbank’s operating procedures. We find that, as an
indicator of German monetary policy during the 1975-1990 period, the
Lofiard rate “$s at least marginally to be preferred to the call rate,
3which is the indicator of policy
studies. This finding may be of
that has been used in
independent interest.
most previous
Section 3 uses the V~ framework to address the question posed by
our paper’s title. Specifically, we ask whether the expected evolution
of the money stock affects the Bundesbank’s setting of the Lombard rate,
given the forecast of inflation (as well as other potential objective
variables) . Our results generally support the inflation-targeting view
of the Bundesbank. In particular, although money growth forecasts
retain predictive power for the Lombard rate (in the sense of Granger-
causality) even when several objectives of policy are allowed for, at
medium-term and longer horizons forecasted inflation explains a much
greater share of the variance of German monetary policy than does
forecasted money growth (or, for that matter, than forecasted changes in
output or the value of the Deutschemark) .
2. I&ntifying monetaq
In order to answer
policy in Ga~y
the question of how the Bundesbank responds to
changes in forecasts of inflation, money growth, or other variables, our




in this section we employ the VAR-based approach suggested
and Mihov (1995). This approach is similar to the
employed by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christian and
Eichenbaum (1992), Sims (1992), Christian, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1994), Strongin (1995), and many other recent papers, in that the
effectg of monetary policy in the economy axe identified with the
dynamic responses of variables in a VA.Rto innovations to an indicator
of monetary policy. The Bernanke-Mihov approach differs from others,
however, in,that it uses estimates of the central bank’s operating
procedure to identify the policy indicator, rather than picking the
4indicator on purely a priori grounds. Section 2.1 describes this
methodology; those familiar with it may skip this subsection without
loss of continuity. Section 2.2 discusses the evolution of Bundesbank
operating procedures and proposes a structural V~ model of those
procedures. Section 2.3 presents results, focusing on the comparison
between the call rate and the Lombard rate as candidate indicators of
German monetary policy.
2.1 Methodology. To derive the Bernanke-Mihov approach formally,
we follow them in supposing that the economy is described by the linear
structural model given in equations (2.1)-(2.2) :
(2.1) Y, =~BiY,., +~C,P,_i+Ayv;
i=o i=O
k
(2.2) P, =~DiY,_i +~GiP,_i+Apv;
;=0 i=o
where boldface variables denote vectors or matrices. The distinction
between variables that are elements of Y and those that are element
P will be explained momentarily.
Equations (2.1)-(2.2) may be viewed as a standard Cowles-type
system of simultaneous equations, in which each variable (i.e., any
of
component of Y or P) is allowed to depend on current or lagged values
of any variable in the system.’ In eqs. (2.1)-(2.2) the v’s are
mutually uncorrelated “structural” or “primitive” disturbances; as in
Bernanke (1986), these structural disturbances are premultiplied by
general matrices A, which permit any disturbance in the Y block to
enter into any equation in that block, and similarly for the P block.
3Expectational variables could be accommodated in this framework by
replacing expected future values with linear projections on current and
past values of any variable in the system. Consistent with the real
business cycle framework, one could also interpret some of the equations
in the system as decision rules relating current choice variables to
variables describing the current state of the economy.
5Thus no restriction is placed on the covariance matrices of composite
error terms within a block. The only Restriction imposed by this way of
writing the error terms is that the error terms in the two blocks are
uncorrelated. Since we will always allow contemporaneous elements of
Y to enter the P block in an unrestricted manner, this assumption is
not particularly stringent.
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) partition the variables under
consideration into two groups, Y and P, which we refer to as “non-
policy” and “policy” variables, respectively. The set of policy
variables includes variables that are potentially useful as direct
indicators of the stance of monetary policy, e.g., short-term interest
rates and reserves measures. Non-policy variables include other
economic variables, such as output and inflation, whose responses to
monetary policy shocks we would like to identify.
With respect to the identification of monetary policy shocks and
their effects on the economy, there are two cases of interest. The
first possibility is that there exists a single variable which is known
a priori to contain the relevant information about the stance of
monetary policy; i.e., P is a scalar, say P, rather than a vector. In




Most of the recent VAR literature has employed a scalar monetary policy
indicator (e.g., the federal funds rate in the United States) . In
European applications, all studies of which we are aware have used a
short-term market interest rate, such as the call rate or a goverment
bill rate, as the policy indicator (see, e.g., Sims, 1992; Gerlach and
Smets, 1995; Clarida and Gertler, 1995; Tsatsaronis, 1995; Barran et
al., 1996) . In the case of a scalar policy indicator, as is by now well
6known, identification of the effects of policy shocks on the non-policy
variables can be achieved by means of a simple “timing” assumption. For
example, as is most common in the literature, suppose we are willing to
assume that policy innovations do not affect non-policy variables within
the same period (i.e., the elements of the vector Co in eq. (2.1) are
all zero) . Under this assumption the system (2.1)-(2.2) can be written
in VAR format by projecting the vector of dependent variables on k lags
of itself. Estimation of the resulting system by standard VAR methods,
followed by a Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix (with the
policy variable ordered last) yields an estimated series for the
exogenous policy shock Vp. Impulse response functions for all variables
with respect to the policy shock can then be calculated, and can be
interpreted as the true structural responses to policy innovations.
It is worth emphasizing the substantial advantage of this
approach, relative to traditional Cowles methods and more completely-
identified VAR analyses, that responses to policy can be measured
without identifying assumptions other than the timing assumption.
However, this methodology does require that one accept the idea that
there are exogenous shocks to monetary policy, uncorrelated with the
current state of the economy. The appendix to this paper illustrates
how such shocks could arise from plausible sources, such as imperfect
current information on the part of the central bank or shifts in central
bank preferences.
The second case of interest occurs when there is no unique, scalar
indicator of policy, i.e., P has two or more elements. This case in
turn is relevant in at least two distinct situations. First, central
banks sometimes use hybrid operating procedures--a combination of
interest-rate targeting and reserves-targeting, for example. In that
scenario, both interest rates and reserves will contain information
7about monetary policy (but will also be affected by shocks to the demand
for reserves and other factors). Second, although it may be that a
scalar measure is ultimately appropriate, the econometrician may be
uncertain about which variable or set of variables is the best measure
of monetary policy, and would like to compare alternative possibilities
statistically. As we demonstrate in the application below, this
situation is also acconunodated by a non-scalar P, taken in this case to
be a list of the candidate indicators.
Identification of policy shocks in the case in which P has
multiple elements is analogous to the scalar case. Suppose that one
element of the set of shocks Vp affecting P in eq. (2.2) is a shock to
monetary policy, denoted V’. To identify V’, and the responses of other
variables in the system to that shock, we make a timing assumption like
the one used in the scalar case; i.e., we assume that innovations to
variables in the policy block do not affect variables in the non-policy
block within the period, or CO=O. Now suppose that we write the
system (2.1)-(2.2) in standard VAR form (with only lagged variables on
the right-hand side, and with the Y block prior to’the P block) ,
Define U; to be the V~ residuals corresponding to the Y block and U:
to be the residuals corresponding to the P block, orthogonalized with
respect to U:. Then Bernanke and Mihov (1995) show that
(2.4) u:= (l- GO)-’APV:
where the right-side parameters and disturbances are as defined in the
structural equation (2.2). Alternatively, dropping subscripts and
superscripts, we can rewrite eq. (2.4) as:
(2.5) u=Gu+Av
8Equation (2.5) is a structural VA.R (SVAR) system, which relates
observable VAR-based residuals U to unobserved structural shocks V, one
of which is the policy shock Vs. This system can be identified and
estimated by conventional methods, allowing recovery of the structural
shocks , including Vs. The policy shock v’ is analogous to the
innovation to the scalar policy indicator in studies such as Bernanke
and Blinder (1992), Sims (1992), and Christian, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1994). AS in the scalar case, the structural responses of all
variables in the system to a policy shock can be measured by the
associated impulse response functions. In the next subsection we apply
this method to an analysis of the Bundesbank’s operating procedure, then
use our estimates to develop an indicator of German monetary policy.
2.2 Instruments and indicators of Bundesbank policy. Bernanke
and Mihov (1995) emphasize that, in order to develop a reliable
indicator of monetary policy, it is important to understand the central
bank’s operating procedure and instruments. In general, using a
variable that the central bank allows to respond to reserves-market
shocks as a policy indicator will lead to incorrect inferences about the
effects of policy changes on the economy. (The appendix illustrates
this point by means of an algebraic example in which the central bank
may target either money or interest rates.) Thus, as a necessary prior
step to finding the appropriate indicator for German monetary policy, we
here briefly discuss and model the Bundesbank’s operating procedure.4
Prior VAR studies which use the call rate or other short-term
market interest rate as a measure of German monetary policy are, at
least to some extent, relying on the analogy to the U.S. federal funds
4Good descriptions of Bundesbank procedures may be found in Trehan
(1988); Kahn and Jacobson (1989); Kneeshaw and van den Bergh (1989); von
Hagen (1989); Batten et al. (1990); Kasman (1992); von Hagen and Neumann
(1993); Clarida and Gertler (1995); and Deutsche Bundesbank (1995).
9rate. Although Bundesbank operations have become increasingly similar
to those of the Fed over time, however, historically there are some
important differences. The Fed has used open-market operations in
government securities as its principal tool of reserves management for
many decades; relatively speaking, the Fed’s other tools–-its ability to
set conunercial banks’ reserve requirements and to make loans through the
discount window--have played a minor role in monetary policy. And,
since the maturation of the federal funds market in the mid-1960s,
except during the 1979-1983 “Volcker experiment”, the Fed has treated
the federal funds rate as its primary short-run target. Thus, at the
operational level, the differences in Fed policy-making between the
1970s and the 1990s are not large.
In contrast, the Bundesbank has seen considerably more evolution
in its instruments of policy. Prior to about 1980, the German central
bank did not make frequent use of open market operations. Instead, in
the earlier period it implemented desired changes in the stance of
monetary policy, for the most part, in one of three ways:
First, it made relatively frequent changes in reserve requirements
(which are fairly high in Germany, compared to other countries) . Some
indication of the active use of reserve requirements is given by Figure
1, which shows the ratio of current required reserves to required
reserves at 1974 legal ratios. (The denominator is obtained by
subtracting currency in circulation from central bank money at 1974
ratios.) Since (given the composition of deposits) the former but not
the latter varies with changes in reserve requirements, this ratio is a
rough measure of how requirements have changed. ~so shown in the
figure are dates of official changes in requirements (denoted by
vertical lines) . Note the relatively frequent use of this instrument
prior to about 1981.Second, in the earlier period the Bundesbank eased (tightened)
policy by increasing (reducing) discount-window borrowing quotas for
banks. Since the discount rate in Germany is below the market rate of
interest, and moral suasion is not used (in the manner of the Fed) to
reduce discount-window borrowing, banks usually borrow up to their
quota. Thus , changes in quotas translated directly into changes in the
quantity of reserves available to the banking system.
Finally, the Bundesbank could affect the quantity of loans through
its second borrowing facility (Lombard loans) by changing the rate
charged banks for those loans (the Lombard rate) . In the earlier period
the Lombard rate was typically held below the market rate for reserves
(the call rate), but above the discount rate, and thus functioned
analogously to the U.S.
For our purposes,
prior to about 1980 was
discount rate.
a key aspect of Bundesbank operating procedures
their relative lack of flexibility. All three
tools--reserve requirements, discount-window quotas, and the Lombard
rate--could be, or at least were, changed only on a discrete rather than
continuous basis. Thus the Bundesbank lacked the ability, enjoyed by
the Fed, of finely targeting market interest rates. However, over the
last fifteen years that situation has changed, for two principal





(repos) with banks, Repos provide a means by which the
can make short-term loans to the banking system. Second,
deepening of securities markets, the Bundesbank has made
use of U.S.-style open-market operations. These two
developments have greatly increased the Bundesbank’s ability to “fine-
tune” movements in market interest rates, such as the call rate.
Indeed, in a short-term operational sense, the Bundesbank is able now to
target the call rate or other rates (such as the repo rate) in very much
the way that the Fed pegs the federal funds rate.
11What implications do the changes in Bundesbank instruments and
operating procedures have for the choice of a monetary indicator for
Germany? A tentative conclusion is that it may
the call rate (or other short-term market rate)
monetary policy, at least prior to 1980 or so.
lacked the tools to target open-market interest
be somewhat risky to use
as one’s indicator of
Because the Bundesbank
rates precisely, it
seems possible that short-term innovations in market rates might have
reflected non-policy factors in the economy, such as shifts in the
demand for reserves, as well as policy innovations. If shocks to the
call rate reflect non-policy influences, then measured impulse responses
to call rate innovations are no longer “clean” estimates of the effects
of monetary policy shocks on the economy.
A bit of indirect evidence on this issue is the persistence of the
“price puzzle” for Germany. For example, Sims (1992) found (both for
Germany and other countries) that the price level rises following a
positive innovation to the call rate, despite the presumption that an
increase in the call rate represents a tightening of monetary policy.
Sims finds that this perverse response of prices persists for Germany
even when commodity prices and the exchange rate are included in the
system to control for anticipated future inflation. Sims’s sample
begins in 1961, and thus includes a lengthy period prior to the
introduction of repos and the expanded use of open-market operations.
However, Clarida and Gertler (1995) estimate VARS with German data
beginning in the mid-1970s
to call rate innovations.
These considerations
to make a closer empirical
and also find a positive response of prices
We present further evidence below,
suggested to us that it might be worthwhile
examination of the Bundesbank’s operating
procedures. We found that, with some conceptual re-definitions, we
could apply the model of the reserves market proposed by Bernanke and
12Mihov (1995) for the U.S. to the German case. Our adaptation of their
model, written in innovation form, is as follows:
(2.7) Total reserves demand:
d
Um =–aua+v
(2.8) Lombard loans demand: ~u=P(um-uM)+v’
(2.9) Nonborrowed reserves supply: Um = ~dvd + #’v’ +#Jv’ +Vn
(2.10) Lombard rate: Um=ydvd+ynv” +ybvb+v’
where TR is total reserves, ~ is Lombard loans, NBR is nonborrowed
reserves, ~ is the Lombard rate, and CR is the call rate.
Equation (2.7) relates the innovation in the demand for bank
reserves to the innovation in the call rate (analogous to the federal
funds rate in the U.S.) and an autonomous shock to reserves demand. For
simplicity, we abstract here from the Bundesbank’s use of reserve
requirements as a policy tool: Hence we measure total bank reserves as
required reserves at 1974 ratios (equal to central bank money at 1974
ratios less currency in circulation), plus excess reserves. This
adjustment, albeit somewhat crude, does eliminate the large jumps in
reserves associated with changes in the legal requirements.
Equation (2.8) assumes that, in innovations form, the demand for
Lombard loans (analogous to discount-window borrowing in the U.S.)
depends on the spread between the call rate and the Lombard rate
(analogous to the U.S. funds rate-discount rate spread) and a shock to
desired Lofiard borrowing. A difference between Lombard borrowing and
U.S. discount-window borrowing is that--as noted above--since 1985 the
Lombard rate has been at
rate is virtually always
Lombard loans to be very
or above the call rate, while the U.S. discount
below the federal funds rate. One would expect
low when the rate charged on those loans
13exceeds the open-market borrowing rate, and that is indeed the case.
However, Lombard loans have not been zero during the past decade by any
means, presumably because some banks have emergency borrowing needs or
have imperfect access to the call market. Since the spread between the
call rate and the Lotiard rate is still a measure of the opportunity
cost of using the Lotiard window, we would expect eq. (2.8) to apply
during the recent period, although one should be wary of possible breaks
in the structural parameters (which we will always allow for) .5
Equations (2.9) and (2.10) describe the behavior of the




total reserves less Lombard loans. Thus , we include
at the discount window as part of “nonborrowed” reserves;
to be the right simplification, since--as discussed above--
discount-window loans are inframarginal and could just as well be
supplied via open-market operations or other methods, Equation (2.9)
allows for the possibility that the Bundesbank can observe and offset
shocks to the bank reserves market-- which would be necessary
the call rate on a month-to-month basis, for example. There




(2.10) describes the Bundesbank’s setting of the Lombard rate; again,
this equation is (so far) unrestricted, allowing both for the Bundesbank
to use the Lombard rate to offset other shocks in the reserves market,
and for autonomous innovations to the Lombard rate, V’ .
‘As our discussant van Hagen pointed out, on a few occasions during our
sample period the Bundesbank imposed additional restrictions on Lombard
lending: Between September 1979 and March 1980, limits on Lombard
lending equal to 15% of the standard rediscount quota were imposed.
Between February 1981 and May 1902, the Bundesbank granted “special”
Lombard loans at 3% above the regular Lombard rate, with provisions for
recall or ch”anges in the rate at short notice; the regular Lombard
window was closed. We do not account for these periods in our analysis,
which may cause us to understate the tightness of monetary policy during
those episodes. Special Lombard loans have been discontinued since 1982.
14Using the identity Um =uMR +Uu, we can write the solution of
this model in the form of eq. (2.4), where
~—d u’= u~ ‘NBR ‘CR u~rv-v Vb V“ v’ , and
(1- G)-’A =
This model has twelve unknown parameters (including four shock
variances) to be estimated from ten residual variances and covariances;
thus fu~ther identifying restrictions are necessary. Bernanke and Mihov
(1995) used two strategies for achieving identification: First, they
showed that some simple operating procedures, such as federal funds
rate-targeting, implied overidentification of this model. Thus the
combination of the model and the proposed operating procedure could be
tested in the data, by applying standard tests of overidentifying
restrictions. Second, as an alternative, they made enough additional
assumptions to just-identify the model, estimates of which implied an
“optimal” policy indicator (in general, a weighted average of
alternative simple indicators) .
Here we restrict ourselves to the first strategy and consider
three simple alternative characterizations of Bundesbank operating
procedures: call-rate smoothing, nonborrowed reserves targeting (where,
again, “nonborrowed reserves” is defined as total reserves less Lombard
loans), and smoothing of the Lombard rate (i.e., insulation” of the
Lombard rate from reserves-market shocks). Each of these alternatives
can be used to impose additional identifying restrictions on the model.
15For the call-rate model, we impose
(2.11) l-~d +pyd =0, 1++’ -py’=o, #’=o
The first two restrictions imply that the call rate does not respond to
(i.e., the Bundesbank offsets) reserves demand and Lombard borrowing
shocks (cf. the third row of the matrix (l-G)-’A above). The third
restriction says that the call rate is allowed to passively adjust
(i.e., no changes are made in nonborrowed reserves) to innovations in
the Lombard rate. This seemed to be the right ass~tion; otherwise, we
would have to assme that changes in the Lombard rate are “sterilized”
and thus have no effect on open-market rates. However, the alternative
assumption, that the call rate is insulated from Lombard rate shocks as
well as reserves and borrowings shocks (#t =fl), led to similar
empirical results.
For nonborrowed-reserves targeting (which seems reasonable to
consider for the Bundesbank, given its putative close attention to money
growth targets), we impose the restrictions
(2.12) #d=o, #b=o, #’=o
i.e., nonborrowed reserves depend only on their own autonomous shocks
and are not systematically adjusted in response to contemporaneous
shocks in the bank reserves market.
Finally, for Lombard-rate targeting, we impose
(2.13) yd=o, yb=(), yn=o
or that the Lombard rate is independent of contemporaneous reserves-
rnarket shocks. The assumptions associated with all three procedures are
identical to those used by Bernanke and Mihov (1995) in their model
including the discount rate. Note that in this setup there are two
16structural shocks that can be interpreted as “policy shocks”: the
reserves innovation V“ (emphasized by the call rate and nonborrowed
reserves models) , and the Lombard rate innovation VJ (emphasized by
Lombard rate model) .
Each of these alternative characterizations of Bundesbank
the
operating procedures imposes three additional restrictions on, and thus
over-identifies, the general model. In the next sub-section we report
parameter estimates and statistical comparisons for these three models.
2.3 Estimates of the Bundesbank’s operating procedure. To
implement the above procedure we need to specify the “nonpolicy”
variables Y and the “policy variables” P. In all VARS discussed in
this section we use three nonpolicy variables: the index of German
industrial production, the German CPI, and the Dow-Jones index of
corrunodity prices (not specific to Germany) . Industrial production and
the CPI a~e probably the best available monthly indicators of output and
inflation. The index of commodity prices is included to account for
supply shocks and to capture information about future inflation that the
Bundesbank might have when choosing its policy stance (see Sims, 1992,
for a discussion). Policy variables include total bank reserves
(defined as central bank money at 1974 reserve ratios, minus currency in
circulation, plus excess reserves) ; “nonborrowed” reserves (total
reserves less Lombard loans) ; the call rate; and the Lombard rate. In
some of the preliminary results described below the Lombard rate is
dropped from the VAR. All data are from Datastream, except the
commodity price index, which is from CITIBASE. Interest rates are
included in the VARS in levels, other variables in log-levels.6
%e include the output, price, and reserves measures in levels despite
their nonstationarity, as has become standard practice in VAR studies.
The levels specification will yield consistent estimates whether
cointegration exists or not, whereas a differences specification is
inconsistent if some variables are cointegrated. Clarida and Gertler
17Data were available
reserves data are missing
19900 In what follows we
from Janua~y 1969 through 1995, except that
during the transition period July-December
always end the sample period in June 1990, to
avoid dealing with the unification period and its aftermath (which
obviously raised special problems for the Bundesbank) .
We applied a variety of lag-length and stability tests to the
reduced-from parameters of the seven-variable V~. The likelihood
test with a modified multiplier suggested by Sims (1980) rejected
truncation at less than twelve lags; hence, for all the principal
ratio
results repo~ted below we use twelve-lag VARS. (For a few shotter-
sample results reported in Table 1, we needed to use fewer lags to
conserve degrees of freedom. Additional tests confirmed that a lag
structure of (1,2,3,4,9,12) was adequate to capture the main dynamics of
the data.) To test stability of the reduced-form parameters (with
unknown break point) we used an LM-type test, testing simultaneously the
coefficients on
of 49 tests per
Andrews (1993).
all lags of each variable in each equation, for a total
estimated VAR.7 Critical values were as tabulated by
All tests used a heteroscedasticity-robust variance-
covariance matrix. We found considerable evidence of instability in the
earlier part of the sample; our ntier of rejections of parameter
stability became less than the ntier expected under the null of no
break only when the start date was 1975:1 or later. Since this date in
any case marked the beginning of the current policy regime, we began all
our VAR analyses with that date. We were not able to reject the null of
(1995) use an error-correction specification, but it does not appear to
have important effects on their results.
‘Testing all lags of each variable in each equation seemed a reasonable
compromise between testing each coefficient separately--which would not
have been informative about the stability of the qualitative dynamic
properties of”.the system--and testing all coefficients in the system,
which would have lacked power. We also performed tests of stability
equation-by-equation, with similar results to those reported in the
text.
18stability of the reduced-form parameters for the sample period beginning
in 1975:1 and ending in 1990:6.
Bernanke and Mihov (1995) focused on the case without discount
rate shocks (Lombard rate shocks, in our context), which is both the
simpler and the more comparable with the prior literature on VAR-based
monetary indicators. As a preliminary exercise, we estimated the
analogous case for Germany, which of course restricted us to
consideration of the call rate and nonborrowed reserves as potential
policy indicators. We used a six-variable VAR (omitting the Lombard
rate), and we set to zero the Lombard rate innovation and the associated
parameters Yd ,yb,Y”, and ~’. To see if changes in the instruments
available to the Bundesbank had had any effect, we estimated the model
for the first ten years and last ten years of the sample, as well as for
the whole fifteen-year sample (re-estimating the VAR each time) , The
last ten years of the sample (1980:7-1990:6) correspond roughly to the
period following the introduction of repos; the first ten-year period
(1975:1-1985:1) ends at the date that the Lombard
rate, exceeding the call rate for the first time.
The results are shown in Table 1. They are
rate became a penalty
reasonable and fairly
comparable to the U.S. results of Bernanke and Mihov (1995). The slope
of the resexves demand function, ~ , is generally found to be small and
insignificantly different from zero, although larger in the nonborrowed
reserves model, as in the U.S. (Strongin, 1995, argues on institutional
grounds that the ass~tion a=o is valid for the U.S.) The slope of
the borrowings function, P, is of the right sign, precisely estimated,
and fairly stable across subsamples. The more interesting findings are
the tests of the overidentifying restrictions: First, the nonborrowed
reserves model is rejected in the full sample and the first subsample
(it does somewhat better in the latter subsample, being rejected at the
1910% level but not at the 5% level). Second, the call rate model is not






two results are consistent with the usual characterization
operating procedures as focusing on interest-rate
in the short run. Third, the call rate model does much
subsample beginning in 1980 (p = 0.947) than it does in
ending in 1985 (p = 0.093). This is at least a bit of
evidence in favor of our hypothesis that the Bundesbank was less able to
target open-market interest rates prior to the advent of repos and
increased use of open-market operations.
We turn now to
Lombard rate and the
be found in Table 2,
above. Since we did
the results from the full model, including the
associated equation, eq. (2.10). The estimates, to
are based on the full seven-variable V~, described
not reject stability of the reduced-form V~
parameters, we use residuals from the VAR estimated for the enti~e
1975:1-1990:6 sample to obtain estimated structural parameters for the
various subsamples. We did however find evidence of a break in the
variance-covariance matrix of V~ residuals in 1981:6; hence we break
several subsamples at that point (which also corresponds roughly to the
introduction of repos), as well as 1985:1 (when the Lombard rate began
to exceed the call rate). The set of parameters for which estimates are
reported differs across models in Table 3, because the alternative
models impose different restrictions.
We skip discussion of the parameter estimates and go directly to
the p-values for the overidentifying restrictions, which form our basis
for choosing among models. Again the nonborrowed reserves model is
strongly rejected for the sample as a whole and for the earlier
subsamples; however, it cannot be rejected for the subsample beginning
in 1981 and does particularly well for the post-1985 period.
20Comparing the call rate and Lombard rate models, we find that
neither is rejected in either the whole sample or in any subsample. To
some extent this is a disappointing finding, since we are therefore not
able to discriminate sharply between these two candidate indicators of
German monetary policy.a However, comparison of p-values does yield
some interesting points. In particular, note that the call rate model
achieves a much higher p-value (0.881) in the period following the
introduction of repos than in the earlier period (0.116), consistent
with arguments made above. Similarly, the Lombard rate model is far
from being rejected in the pre-1985 period, before the Lombard rate
became a penalty rate (p = 0.925); after 1985, this model does
relatively less well (p = 0.423) . A somewhat anomalous result is that
the Lombard rate nevertheless achieves a better p-value than the call
rate in the last, short sample period, 1985-1990. Judging by the
estimate of ~d from the Lombard rate model, which is only 0.114 and not
statistically different from zero, and by the earlier finding that the
nonborrowed reserves model does well in the post-1985 period, there
appears to be evidence of reduced smoothing of market interest rates
during the pre-unification period.
Overall, although the data do not speak very strongly, the results
suggest a slight preference of the Lombard rate over the call rate as an
indicator of Bundesbank policy for the pre-1990 period. The Lombard
rate has a (marginally) higher p-value for the whole sample, and for
three of the four subsamples considered. From an a priori perspective,
the weakest case for the Lombard rate should be in the 1985-1990 period,
‘In early estimations using the entire sample we were able to strongly
reject the call rate in favor of the Lombard rate, a finding that
motivated us to pursue this line further. It appears now that this
rejection was due somehow to the instability of the first-stage V~ in
the early 1970s. However, this result may still be taken as a
cautionary note to those considering the call rate as an indicator for
the period prior to 1975.
21when this rate became a penalty rate. Yet as Table 2 shows, the Lombard
rate is not close to being rejected as an indicator for this subperiod,
and its movements after 1985 were very close to those of the call rate.
For these reasons, we use the Lombard rate as the main policy indicator
in the exercises of Section 3. However, we also check the robustness of
our results to the use of the call rate and a cotiination of the Lotiard
rate and the call rate.
Figure 2 shows the dynatic responses of industrial production and
the CPI to innovations in the call rate and the Lombard rate, the two
non-rejected indicators. These impulse responses are calculated from
four-variable VARS including the same set of non-policy variables as
above plus the relevant indicator. The main point of interest is that,
unlike the call rate, the response of the price level to Lombard rate
innovations does not exhibit the “price puzzle”. The statistical
uncertainty about this result is large, but we nevertheless find it
encouraging for the use of the Lombard rate as a policy indicator.
3. The Bundesbank: Closet inflation targeter?
We are prepared now to try to answer the question posed by the
introduction, of whether the Bundesbank is better characterized as an
inflation targeter or as a money targeterm We first briefly discuss
some historical evidence, then turn to our statistical test.
Although the Bundesbank has publicly emphasized the importance of
money targets in its policy-making since 1975, it has been often noted
that these money targets are tied to projections of inflation and
potential output growth through the quantity equation relationship (von
Hagen, 1995; Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992; von Hagen and Neumann, 1993) .
Our attempt to reconstruct that calculation from Bundesbank reports is
shown in Table 3. The column labelled “money growth target” shows the
22official ex ante targets (for growth of central bank money prior to
1988, M3 growth thereafter), as set in December prior to the year to
which the target applies. As in von Hagen (1995), what we have labelled
the “inflation target” is the announced rate of “unavoidable inflation”
for 1975-1985; afteI 1985, the inflation target is always set to 2.o%,
which the Bundesbank has deemed to be the rate consistent with “price
stability”. Also given are the Bundesbank’s estimates of growth of
“production potential” and their stated adjustment for velocity. By the
Bundesbank’s procedure the money growth target should be the sum of the
inflation target and forecasted potential output growth, less the
velocity adjustment. This is usually the case (or nearly so) in Table
3, although note that after 1978 money gzowth targets are generally set
as a range rather than as a point.g
The impression one receives from the table is that, for the most
part, the Bundesbank has made its money growth targets subservient to
its inflation targets. Note that the inflation targets decline steadily
(except in the oil-shock year, 1980), and are considerably less volatile
than the money growth targets; and that, as mentioned, money growth
targets are usually specified as ranges, while inflation targets are
points (except in 1981). Also, on one occasion (1987) the Bundesbank
changed its targeted money aggregate, an event that occurred when above-
target money growth coincided with below-target inflation.
The Bundesbank has subjugated its money growth objective to its
inflation objective in another sense, in its willingness to deviate from
money growth targets to offset unexpected inflation. This point--which
has been emphasized by von Hagen (1995)--is also illustrated in Table 3,
by the columns which show targets, outcomes, and deviations from targets
9 Part of the’.discrepancy between the actual money growth targets and
the targets implied by the quantity-theory calculation arises because
inflation rates are expressed as annual averages while money growth
rates (after 1978) are measured fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
23(or from the middle of target ranges) for both money growth and
inflation. At least through unification in 1990, the record indicates a
clear negative relationship between deviations of money growth from
target and deviations of inflation from target, suggesting a willingness
of the Bundesbank to “lean against the (inflationary) wind”. (The
regression coefficient of the money growth deviation on the inflation
deviation for 1975-1990 is -0.872, with a t-statistic of 4.0.) Indeed,
the Bundesbank achieves its target range for money in only a minority of
cases . However, after 1990 there has been at least a temporary change
in behavior, with inflation and money growth tending to deviate in the
same instead of opposite directions.
Despite these indications that the Bundesbank is “really” an
inflation targeter, such a conclusion would not fit entirely with the
Bundesbank’s own claims. For example, a recent official publication
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995) includes the following corrunentary:
“More recently, the central banks of some countries (e.g. Canada,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Finland) have abandoned the
practice of setting an intermediate target and switched to
targeting the final goal direct. However, the transition to such
a one-tier strategy of inflation taxgeting was not effected
because such strategies are inherently superior--say, in terms of
theoretical approach. It was effected not by choice but rather of
necessity, since (particularly in the wake of radical change in
the financial markets) the traditional monetary relationships had
become unstable, and there was no longer a predictable correlation
between the intermediate target variable and prices. The one-tier
strategy would thus appear to be a “second-best” solution if a
suitable intermediate target is no longer available. ..The
disadvantages of such a multi-indicator approach lie in a very
high degree of complexity, the associated lack of transparency for
the general public and the risk of a certain disorientation of
monetary policy decisions. For these reasons an intermediate
target strategy is preferable to targeting the final goal direct
as long as monetary policy has at its disposable an intermediate
target variable which basically meets the above-mentioned
requirements. ..“(pp. 67-8)
We take the above statement as asserting the view that targeting
money growth can be superior to targeting the forecast of inflation--
notwithstanding Svensson’s (1996) argument to the contrary--because
24money targeting is easier to explain to the public and perhaps because
it limits the scope for poor policy decisions (“disorientation”) . If
this statement accurately reflects German policymakers’ views, then
clearly they must sometimes allow policy to respond to deviations of
money growth from the projected path, even if inflation is on target.
In the remainder of this section we attempt to evaluate
statistically whether the Bundesbank should be thought of as an
inflation targeter or not. We do this by asking the question: Given
forecasted inflation, do changes in forecasted money growth affect
Bundesbank policy? And if so--to take the question one step further--is
it because money growth is correlated with other goal variables of the
Bundesbank, or because the Bundesbank considers it intrinsically
desirable to hit its money target?
Although our test is an intuitive one, it may be useful to
motivate it by a simple example. Consider an economy that lasts three
periods, t = O, 1, 2. In period O, the log price level pot the log
money supply rno, and the central bank’s policy instrument (e.g., the
overnight interest rate) 10 are given and known. In periods 1 and 2,
prices and money evolve according to
(3”1) Pt=m, +&p,
(3.2) m,=–bit.l+sw
Equation (3.1) says that prices depend on the money supply and other
stochastic factors, such as velocity shocks. According to (3.2), the
money stock in turn is affected by stochastic factors and (with a one-
period lag) by the policy instrument. We assume for simplicity that the
error terms affecting prices and money are random walks (it can be shown
that our results hold for more general stochastic processes):
25(3.3) &p,=&pr.l+qp,
E E~,_l + q~ = ml
where the ~’s are i.i.d., mean-zero random variables.
Assume that in period O the central bank sets growth targets, foI
t = o to t = 2, for prices and money. From (3.1), we know that
EO(p2-PO)=EO(rn2 -mO), so consistency requires the targeted growth
rates of prices and money to be the same; without significant loss of
generality, set both of these targets to zero. Interim values of pzices
and money are realized in t = 1: since 10 is given, these interim values
depend only on the realizations of ~Pl and ~~l. The question we want
to ask is, how will the central bank adjust its policy instrument in the
interim period, j,, in response to its new information?
The answer depends, of course, on the central bank’s objectives.
Assme that, as of t = 1, the central bank’s loss function is
(3.4) E,[+(p~-Po) 2+f(m2-mo)2]+~(il –io)*
where ~l[.] signifies the expectation conditional on information
available in t = 1, and a and d are non-negative parameters. Equation
(3.4) says that the central bank’s loss depends on the expected squared
deviations of inflation and money growth from their targets, with Cl the
relative weight put on the money growth target per se; a “pure”
inflation targeter sets .a=O, i.e., it cares about money growth only
insofar as it affects inflation. The last term in (3.4) captures an
interest-rate-smoothing motive, for which there is considerable
evidence, both formal and informal.
Minimizing the loss function (3,4) yields the optimal value of the
policy instrument in period 1, l;:
26b(&m,+ &p,– po) +~~(gml- ~o) +~~o
(3.5) 1:=
The innovation






in 1,, relative to its expectation as of period O, is
~[(~ml+~P1)+uqml 1 =
bz(l+a)+a’
in the policy instrument can be related to the
the forecasts of inflation and money growth. Using the
revision in the inflation forecast, EIP2–EOP2, equals
–b(i~ - Eoi~) + q~, + qPl ; and, similarly, that the revision in the money
growth forecast, E,m2-Eom2, equals -b(i~-Eoif)+qmi, some algebra
reveals that
(3.7) i: - Eoi~ = ~[(E,p2 -Eop2)+a(Elm2 -Eom2)]
That is, the innovation in the policy instrument responds to interim
innovations in the forecasts of inflation and money growth, with a
relative weight that depends on the importance of money deviations in
the central bank’s loss function. In particular, if the central bank is
a “pure” inflation targeter, and it therefore puts no weight on
deviations of money from target except insofar as money affects
inflation {a= O), then changes in the instrument will be related only
to changes in forecasted inflation and not, given forecasted inflation,
to changes in forecasted money growth. In contrast, if money growth
enters the objective function independently, then the policy’ instrument
will respond to changes in forecasted money growth even if forecasted
inflation is held constant.
besides inflation and money
changes in the forecasts of
More generally, if additional factors
growth are of concern to the central bank,
these variables will have marginalpredictive power for the policy instrment, given forecasts of inflation
and money.
These insights provide the basis for our test of the inflation-
targeting propensities of the Bundesbank.1° We began by constructing
monthly time series of twelve-month-ahead forecasts for inflation, money
growth, and other variables to be
forecasts were constructed from a
non-policy variables, the Lotiard
The in-sample, twelve-month-ahead
specified in a moment. In-sample
six-variable VAR including the three
rate, money, and the exchange rate.11
forecasts of inflation obtained by
this method fit closely
as shown in Table 3.
Our main tests of
with the series of Bundesbank inflation targets
the determinants of German monetary policy are
given in Table 4. The basic result is illustrated by the first colm
of ntiers corresponding to Equation 1, under the heading “Lombard rate”
(ignore the other columns for now). These results are drawn from a
twelve-lag VA.Rincluding three variables: the forecast
over the next twelve months, at each date; the forecast




The question we ask is: Given twelve lags of the inflation forecast and
1° In his cormnent on this paper at the conference, Larry Christian
pointed out another implication of this framework: namely, that
deviations of inflation from target should be unforecastable.
Equivalently, the best statistical forecast of inflation should always
equal the official target. These implications are rejected by the data
at most horizons, but (like the analogous “random-walk” tests of the
permanent-income hypothesis) these rejections do not shed much light on
the quantitative significance of the deviation from inflation targeting.
For this reason we prefer the test described in the text.
llWe compared in-sample forecasts of inflation and other variables based
(1) on an autoregression; (2) on the “base” VA.R, including the three
non-policy variables and the Lombard rate; and (3) on the base VAR
augmented by various combinations of the log of the money stock (CBM
spliced to M3 in 1988) and the log of the DM/dollar exchange rate,
twelve monthly lags being used in all cases. Statistical tests
(including Gqanger-causality and block-erogeneity tests) favo~ed the
inclusion of both the money stock and the exchange rate in the
forecasting equations. In particular, the fact that money contains
significant marginal information about future inflation is interesting,
given the claim that money is targeted for that very reason.
28twelve lags of the Lombard rate itself, do lags of the money growth
forecast have additional predictive power for the Lombard rate?lz In a
Granger sense, Table 4 shows that the answer is yes: Both inflation
forecasts and money forecasts Grange~-cause the Lombard rate at better
than a 5% level. Thus there is some evidence that the money forecast
affects Bundesbank policy decisions, even given the inflation forecast.
But how big is this effect? The second part of Table 4 shows the
percentage of the forecast variance for the Lombard Kate explained at
different horizons by innovations to each of the three variables in the
VAR. We find that at short horizons the forecast error for the Lombard
rate is dominated by its own shocks, and at longer horizons it is
dominated by shocks to the inflation forecast. Shocks to the money
growth forecast do not play an important role quantitatively in
determining the Lotiard rate at any horizon, This is the basis for our
conclusion that the Bundesbank is better characterized as an inflation
targeter than as a money targeter.
It would be interesting to know whether the Granger-causal
relationship between money growth forecasts and the Lotiard rate arises
because the Bundesbank is interested in money growth per se, or because
money growth forecasts goal variables other than inflation. Equations 2
and 3 in Table 4 add sequentially the one-year forecasts of industrial
production growth and nominal exchange-rate (DM/$) depreciation.
(Exchange-rate depreciation is ordered after, rather than before the
Lotiard rate on the grounds that exchange rates are not a “slow-moving”
variable, like inflation or output; this ordering modestly reduces the
share of forecast variance attributed to the exchange rate, but of
12The example presented above suggests that we should relate
innovations in the Lombard rate only to innovations in contemporaneous
forecasts. We include lagged forecasts in our test to allow for outside
(information-gathering) and inside (decision-making) lags in the policy
process.
29course does not affect the Granger-causality statistics. ) We find that
the money growth forecast continues to Granger-cause the Lombard rate at
the 5% level in both cases, suggesting that the Bundesbank pays
attention to money growth for some reason (establishment of credibility,
perhaps) not directly related to its predictive power for ultimate goal
variables, There is also some evidence, consistent with what others
have found, that the Bundesbank pays attention to ultimate objectives
other than inflation: Forecasted output Granger-causes the Lotiard rate
in the presence of the other variables, and makes
the forecast variance decomposition as well. The
exchange rate depreciation does not Granger-cause
it has some effect on the Lombard rate’s forecast
some contribution to
expected rate of
the Lombard rate, but
error at longer
horizons. (This latter result is difficult to interpret; it may arise
from the collinearity of expected exchange rate depreciation and
expected inflation. ) Our main result survives, however, in that
innovations to inflation forecasts continue to play a large role, and
innovations to money growth forecasts a small role, in the determination
of Lotiard rate forecast errors,
To check that these results do not depend on the use of the
Lombard rate as the policy indicator, we repeated all of these tests
using as the indicator a) the call rate, and b) a “spliced” series based
on the Lombard rate prior to 1985 and the call rate afterwards.13 The
Granger-causality results using the alternative indicators are shown in
the second and third columns of numbers in the top half of Table 4. The
results for the call rate seem even stronger
The inflation forecast always Granger-causes
level, while the money growth forecast never
than for the Lombard rate:
the call rate at the 5%
does. For the spliced
13We also considered using the repo rate. However, this rate is
available for a shorter period and is very close to the call rate over
the period for which it is available.
30series, inflation forecasts Granger-cause the policy indicator at the 5%
level in the presence of money and output forecasts, but only at the 10%
level when an exchange rate forecast is added. Variance decomposition
exercises for the alternative indicators (not shown to conserve space)
looked quite similar to those for the Lombard rate, confirming the
dominance of inflation forecasts as a determinant of German monetary
policy actions, particularly at longer horizons.14
As a final exercise, we use the largest VA.R from Table 4 (with the
LoWard rate as the policy indicator) to study the response of the
system to an innovation in the inflation forecast. The impulse
responses, shown in Figure 3, convey a plausible story: A positive
innovation to the inflation forecast leads to a policy tightening, as
captured by a rise in the Lombard rate. Forecasted output growth
declines, as would be expected, and the rate of expected depreciation of
the exchange rate rises.15 Most interesting, though, is that the
forecasted rate of money growth falls in an almost mirror image of the
increase in forecasted inflation. This pattern seems to confirm the
“leaning against the wind” story told by von Hagen (1995) and others.
4. Conclusion
Our main conclusion has been amply foreshadowed. In brief,
although the Bundesbank uses money growth as an important informational
variable and operating guide, and despite its protestations to the
14We also ran our tests ’using the forecasted deviations of inflation
and money growth from the official targets (and of output and exchange
rates from their Hodrick-Prescott trends) in place of the simple
forecasts. In doing so, we experimented with different assumptions
about the willingness of the Bundesbank to try to offset previous
overshooting or undershooting of targets. The results were not much
different from those reported in Table 4.
151t is probably dangerous to overinterpret the latter finding, given
the asset-price nature of exchange rates. Possible explanations for an
increased rate of expected depreciation include an overshooting effect
from money tightening, and the information effect of the increased rate
of anticipated inflation,
31contrary, it seems to be better characterized as an inflation targeter
than as a money targeter. Following the example set by German monetary
policy should not be construed as ~igid adherence to money growth
targets, a practice which the Bundesbank itself has not followed.
32Appendix. What in a monetary policy shock?
VAR-based analyses of monetary policy have proliferated in recent
years, both in academic research and in policy-making. This widespread
use reflects the method’s strengths, notably its simplicity and its
tendency to deliver “reasonable” results. As should be expected for any
novel methodology, the VAR-based approach has also drawn its share of
criticism--some justified, of course, but some less so. In this
appendix we use simple examples to address two questions that have been
raised about the central concept of “shocks” to monetary policy, as
follows:
(1) What is the source of monetary policy shocks?
(2) Why draw a distinction between innovations to the money supply
and innovations to monetary policy?
(1
monetary
Some critics have questioned the concept of “shocks” to
policy. They point out that the Fed and the Bundesbank
certainly do not randomize their policy actions explicitly,
errors made in the implementation of policies are likely to
reve~sed. How then could shocks to policy be laxge enough
In general, all that is necessary for what we call a
to occur is that the policy decision be influenced
(personalities, beliefs, political considerations,









current state of the economy. In the following example we illustrate
that valid (in the sense required by our paper) policy shocks can be
generated from two realistic sources: (a) imperfect information on the
part of the central bank about the current economy, and (b) changes in
the relative weights put by the central bank on moderating fluctuations
in output and inflation. In particular, neither explicit randomization
33nor persistent implementation errors are needed to generate meaningful
policy shocks.




(A”4) P, =E,_,m, =m,_,
Equation (Al) says that output Y is determined by real money balances
??I-p and a supply shock X that we take to be i.i.d. with mean zero.
The central bank’s policy reaction function is described by (A.2): The
change in the money supply between periods t-1 and t is inversely
related to the supply shock observed by the central bank at t. (We give
further justification of this assumption below; later we also relax the
assumption that the money supply is the operating instrument) . However,
the central bank does not observe the contemporaneous supply shock;
instead it obsersves (and bases its policy on) a noisy measure of the
supply shock ~, which is equal to the actual shock plus uncorrelated
measurement error (eq. (A,3)). We assume the error in observation
reflects lags in data collection, revisions, etc., which obscure the
true state of the economy for one period only; hence both the Fed and
the econometrician can observe past values of the supply shock without
error. Finally, we assue that prices prevailing in period t are set at
the end of t-1, using only information available in t-1. If we assume
that prices are set so that the expected value of output equals its
full-employment level (which we normalize to zero), than it is
straightforward to deduce that prices will equal the expected money
stock, which in turn equals the lagged money stock (eq. (A.4)).
34The solution for output, expected inflation, and the money supply
in period t is
(A.5) ~, =X1-fl(X, +~t)
(A.6) pf+,-p, =-p(~, +n, )
(A.7) m, =ml., - fl(~, + n, )
Note that the solution involves simultaneous determination of the macro
variables and the money supply. Thus this example does not literally
conform to the framework used in this paper, which bases identification
on the assumption that policy shocks affect macro variables only with a
one-period delay. However, the assumption of simultaneity is for
simplicity only and could be eliminated by a more complicated
specification; it does not affect the focus of this example, which is
the interpretation of policy shocks.
Now we suppose that the econometrician estimates the central
bank’s reaction function (A.7), using her ex post knowledge of the
supply shock in period t. (Note that this provides a rationalization
for using revised data, that was not known contemporaneously to the Fed,
when estimating the reaction function. ) In this case the policy shock
v’ would be consistently estimated by a least-squares regression of
money on the supply shock to be:
(A.8) v: =–pqt
Given this policy shock, the econometrician can correctly estimate the
effects of monetary policy shocks on the economy, i.e., from (A.5) and
(A.6):
35This first example shows that data errors and revisions provide a
possible source of policy shocks. An alternative rationalization is
random preferences on the part of the central bank: To illustrate this
possibility, suppose now that the central bank observes the supply shock
perfectly within the period (so that ~= O) but chooses its reaction
coefficient ~ in each period to minimize the value of the following
period-by-period loss function in the variances of inflation and output:
(A.9) L = (p,+, –P,)* ‘@:
where @ is the weight on output deviations from full employment. Using
the model (A.1)-(A.4) above but with the measurement error set to zero,
we find that the value of p that mini~zes (A.9) is given by
(A.1O) fl=~
1+8
Now suppose that the central bank’s aversion to output fluctuations @
is a stationary random variable, so that P is as well. Let the mean of
P be ~. The reaction function (A.2) can now be written
(All) m, =mr., - B, - (P, - 7)X,.
36If we make the assumption of statistical independence between the shock
to central bank preferences and the supply shock (implying that
—
~,.l[@,-P)x,l=oJ~ then the solution for output and inflation is
(A.12) y, = (1-1)X, -@, - j)xf
(A”13) P,+, -P, = -z, -(P, -7)X,
Here we can identify the monetary policy shock with the random part of
the reaction function, eq. (All) :
Despite the presence of the supply shock term in (A.14), which would
induce a form of heteroscedasticity, the assumption that random
fluctuations in central bank preferences are independent of the supply
shock is sufficient to permit the monetary policy shock term to be
extracted from (All) by least-squares regression. Again, as (A.12) and
(A.13) show, if supply shocks are controlled for, the estimated policy
innovations could be used to correctly identify the effects of monetary
surprises on output and inflation (cf. eq, A.8) ,
(2) In the example above the policy shock was identified with the
innovation to the money supply. To show that this is not always
correct, and to reinforce the point that it is important to base the
identification of policy shocks on knowledge of the central bank’s
operating procedure, consider the following simple model of the type
explored by Sargent and Wallace (1975):
37(A.15) ~, = -b[R, – (E,p(+, - P,)1+e:
(A.16) m,–pt =cy, –dR, +e~
(A.17) Y, = g(P, – ~,.lPt) +e:
Equations (A.15)-(A.17) are an IS relationship, a money demand equation,
and a Lucas-type aggregate supply curve respectively. R is the one-
period nominal interest rate, and the t?’are mean-zero, i.i.d., mutually
uncorrelated shocks. Note that in this example prices are not pre-
determined, but aggregate supply depends on the deviation of actual from
anticipated prices.
Consider two cases. In the first case, called money targeting,
the central bank sets the money supply equal to its lagged value plus an
M unpredictable disturbance, ~ :
Note that, under money targeting, the money supply does not respond to
the contemporaneous non-policy shocks f?: . In the second case, called
interest-rate targeting, monetary policy is used to set the nominal
interest rate equal to its equilibrium value (which is zero, if we
maintain the martingale assumption for the money stock) plus an
unpredictable disturbance, VR :
(A.19) R, = q:
38Rational-expectations solutions of the model conditional on
lagged money stock can be obtained by the method of undetermined






dg -bg b(l+d) bg(l+d;
d -b -(bc+d) b(l+d)
l+cg b+g be-l g(bc -1)
10 0 0 1
where AM =d(b+g)+b(l+cg).

















Now suppose that we want to recover the effect of a one-unit,
autonomous innovation in the money stock on an endogenous va~iable, say
output . If the central bank is targeting money, so that innovations to
the money supply are exogenous by assumption, then the desired magnitude
can be read off directly from the the last colm of the 4x4 matrix
bg(l + d)
(A.20); its value iS
b(l+cg)+d(b+g) “
Under money targeting, this
in
magnitude could be calculated as the regression coefficient of output
residuals on money residuals. What if, instead, the central bank is
targeting interest rates? Then, as the reader can verify from (A.21),




s the response of output to an interest-rate innovation,
for normalization purposes) by the response of money to an
Kate innovation. Again, these values are obtainable by simpler
regression.
The example illustrates that, as long as the econometrician knows
or can estimate the central bank’s operating procedure, it is irrelevant
whether that procedure is interest-rate targeting or money-targeting; in
either case, the true impact effect of an innovation to money can be
obtained. However, it is also true that if the wrong operating
procedure is asswed, the correct impact effect will not be obtained.
Suppose for example that interest rates are being targeted, but the
econometrician measures the impact effect of a money shock by the
regression of the output residual on the money residual. As can be
calculated from (A.21), this regression coefficient bears no particular
relation to the desired impact effect; instead, it is a mongrel
coefficient that depends on the impact of each type of shock on money
and output, and the relative variances of those shocks. We conclude
that identification of the operating procedure is an important
preliminary step for valid inferences about the effects of monetary
policy shocks.
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42Table 1. Estimates of models of the operating procedure
(6-variable VAR)

























b. Nonborrowed reserves model
















































Notes: Estimates are based on six-variable VARS, excluding the Lotiard
rate (see text) . The first-stage VAR is re-estimated for each
subperiod, using 12 lags in the full sample and 6 non-consecutive lags
(1,2,3,6,9,12) in the sub-samples. The final column gives the p-value
for the test of the overidentifying restrictions of the model for each
subperiod. Standaxd errors are in parentheses.Table 2. Estimates of models of the operating procedure
(7-variable VAR)
a. Call rate model
Restrictions : I-@ ’+py ’’=o, l+~b-pyb=o, +’=0
Sample Parameter estimates Test of
period a P 4’ 4’ y“ OIR (p-value)
1975:1- 00016 .0156 0.918 -0.986 -7.91
1990:6
0.427
(:00315) (.0178) (0.341) (0.159) (23.2)
1975:1- -.00004 0123 0.934 -0.993 -1.11 0.116
1981:6 (.01704) (:0077) (1.547) (0.064) (10.8)
1981:7- .00104 .0234 0.914
1990:6 (.00205) (.0465) (0.482
1975:1- -.00057 .0124 0.938
19e4:12 (.00438) (.0122) (0.369
1985:1- 00192 0228 0.901







b. Nonborrowed reserves model


























































c. Lombard rate model














a P 4’ 4’
.00635 ,0075 0.561 -1.044
(.00369) (.0074) (0.541) (0.024)
04477 .0105 -0.152 -1.028
(:06793) (.0026) (0.098) (0.018)
.00330 .0247 0.706 -0.988
(.00213) (.0200) (0.511) (0.166)
.00792 0061, 0.448 -1,046
(.00496) (:0063) (0.559) (0.021)
.00476 1095 0.114 0.057


















Notes : Estimates are for three models of Bundesbank operating
procedures, described in the text. Estimates for subsamples are based
on residuals estimated for a single VAR over the entire 1975-1990 sample
period. Twelve lags of each variables are included in the VAR. The
final column gives the p-value for the test of the overidentifying
restrictions of the model for each subperiod. Standard errors are in
















































































































































































Notes: “Money” is central bank money at 1974 reserve ratios through
1987, West German M3 for 1988-1990, and all-German M3 since 1991. Money
growth Iates are measured year over year for 1975-1978 and fourth
quarter to fourth quarter thereafter. Deviations are measured from the
midpoint of the target range; brackets indicate that the money-growth
outcome was within the target range. For 1975-1985, inflation targets
are the announced rate of “unavoidable inflation”. Since 1986, the
inflation target has been 2.0%, the rate judged consistent with “price
stability”. Money growth targets are calculated (using the quantity
equation) as the inflation target plus the potential growth of
production minus an adjustment for expected changes in velocity.
l The 1991 target range for money growth was lowered to 3-5% in July.
l * Includes expected increase in capacity utilization as well as
increase in production potential.
“+ Includes “price rise related to administrative decisions” regarding
eastern Germany as well as velocity adjustment.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Reports and Annual Reports,
various issues.Table 4. Determinants of German monetary policy
Granger-causes policy indicator?
(p-value)







































Et(ER:+12-ERt) .3742 .4385 .9543
Percentage of Lombard rate forecast variance
(horizon in months)






























3.4 1.7 1.1 0.8
0.0 0.6 0.7 0.9




3.7 2.1 2.2 2.5
0.1 1.0 3.8 8.0
0.7 0.7 0.8 1.2














0.3 1.0 3.1 5.0
0.0 0.6 2.4 5.3
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
99.0 95,0 91.8 87.5






Notes: This table is derived from three-, fou~-, and five-variable VARS
including combinations of the policy indicator (the Lombard rate, the
call rate, or a splice of the two rates); and twelve-month-ahead VAR-
based forecasts of the growth rates of the CPI, industrial production,
the money stock (CBM through 1987, M3 afterwards), and the DM/$ exchange
rate. The top half of the table gives p-values for tests of whether
each variable Granger-causes the alternative policy indicators, with low
values indicating a significant relationship. The bottom half of the
table shows decompositions of forecast variance at various horizons for
the Lombard rate only.Figure 2: of OUtpUL pric~, and [nterat ~te~ tO Call ~te and Lombard
Shocb b TWO V-tor Autoregr~sions
Cal]?ate Model. Re~pausc of1P Lombard Rate Model. Re~ue O([P
Cail ‘?ateModel. Response ofCPI




















IFi~re 3: Responses of the Lombard Rate and ForecastsofInflation, Output Growth,
.Money Growth, and Exchange Rate Depreciation to an Innovation in the .
One-Year Forecastof Inflation
Response oflnf]allon?orecast
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